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FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION-SECTION 2036: Shares of Stock of
Closely Held Corporation Placed in an Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust
by Decedent Were Not Includible in His Estate, Even Though He
Retained the Right to Vote the Shares Transferred
INTRODUCTION
Omnipresent among federal estate tax statutes are elusive "key
words and phrases" upon which much, if not all, estate planning is
based.' Because federal estate tax law requires the decedent to have
relinquished, during his life-time, "control" of property which he
desires to be excluded from his estate for estate tax purposes2 and
because most clients would rather retain such "control," the estate
planner is often confronted with various sections of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, and in particular, section 2036. 3 Such was the
case in United States v. Byrum.4
Milliken C. Byrum, who owned at least 71 percent of the stock
of three closely held corporations, transferred inter vivos a portion
of these shares to an irrevocable trust with his children, or their
surviving children, as beneficiaries. The corporate trustee was
vested with broad and detailed powers of control and management.
These powers were exercisable in the trustee's sole discre-
tion, subject to certain rights reserved by Byrum: (i) to vote
the shares of unlisted stock held in the trust estate, (ii) to
disapprove the sale or transfer of any trust assets, including
1. Interpretation of such phrases as "in contemplation of death" and "to the extent of
interest therein," INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2033 & 2035 respectively, has been refined in
regulations and decisions thereto. That refinement process continues.
2. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 provides:
(a) GENERAL RuLE. The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his
life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from.
4. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
5. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
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the shares transferred to the trusts, (iii) to approve invest-
ments and reinvestments, (iv) to remove the trustee and
'designate another corporate Trustee to serve as successor.'I
Included in the trustee's broad power was the authority to pay the
income and corpus to the beneficiaries for education, care, mainte-
nance and support. When the youngest child reached majority, the
trust was to be terminated and the property transferred to separate
trusts for each child. The separate trusts would terminate individu-
ally when each beneficiary reached the age of 35. Although Byrum
owned at his death less than 50 percent of the shares in two of the
corporations and 59 percent in the other, he still retained the right
to vote 71 percent of the shares because of his reserved power to vote
the shares held in trust.6
Because of the rights reserved by Byrum and the alleged control
that he had over such property, the government contended "that the
transferred stock was properly included within Byrum's gross estate
under section 2036(a)." 7 Accordingly, the inclusion of these shares
of stock which were excluded from the original estate tax return
increased Byrum's estate and resulted in additional estate tax. After
the executrix paid the additional tax, a suit for a tax refund was
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio. The executrix was granted summary judgment8 and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed." The United States Supreme Court granted
the commissioner's petition for certiorari. 0
SECTION 2036(a)(2)
Decedent's Ability to Establish Dividend Policy
The major contention of the Internal Revenue Service was that
because the decedent allegedly had control over the dividend policy
of the three corporations, he, in effect, could designate whether the
present beneficiaries or the remaindermen would enjoy the earnings
of the three companies. (The present beneficiaries and remainder-
men would not be synonymous if a child of Byrum died before
reaching 35 and final distribution of the trust property.) Hence, the
6. Id. at 128-29.
7. Id. at 130.
8. Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
9. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971).
10. United States v. Byrum, 404 U.S. 937 (1971).
11. See note 3 supra.
19731
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss1/8
158 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
government asserted that the stock was properly included in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)(2)." To arrive at this
conclusion, the commissioner reasoned that because the decedent
had retained sufficient voting power to nominate his choice of direc-
tors, he could control the pay-out pattern of the earnings of the
companies. And by controlling the dividend pattern, the govern-
ment contended that the decedent could determine the amount of
income available for immediate distribution to the present benefici-
aries. This reasoning was rejected by the Supreme Court.
In similar situations, the Court had not held property includi-
ble merely because the decedent retained powers of management
over the trust, provided that there were "ascertainable external
standards" upon which the settlor-decedent was required to base
the management policy of the trust.'2 The primary issue was, there-
fore, whether Byrum had unfettered discretion in voting the trans-
ferred shares or whether an "ascertainable external standard" re-
strained him from voting the transferred shares as he pleased. The
Court held there was such a standard. In this determination, the
Court necessarily distinguished the instant case from the govern-
ment's principal case-United States v. O'Malley.'3
The cases were distinguished on the basis of the nature of the
retained control. Pursuant to the trust instrument, the decedent in
O'Malley, as one of three co-trustees, was given a discretionary
"right" to pay the trust income to the life beneficiary or accumulate
the income for the benefit of the remaindermen. Because the
O'Malley discretionary "right" brought that case within the pur-
view of section 2036(a) (2), "the taxpayer conceded that the original
assets transferred into the trust were includible."'" However, the
issue in O'Malley was whether the accumulated income was to be
included. The Court held that it was includible under section
2036(a)(2) for the same reason for which the original assets were
included. On the other hand, Byrum's retained authority over the
transferred shares was of a different nature. While the "right" in
O'Malley was legally enforceable under a provision in the trust, the
"power" in Byrum was
12. The taxpayers in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929), and Estate
of King v. Comm'r., 37 T.C. 973 (1962), successfully argued that "wide latitudes in the
exercise of discretion" did not subject the trusts to federal estate tax.
13. 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
14. Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
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the power to use his majority position and influence over
the corporate directors to 'regulate the flow of dividends' to
the trust. [It] was neither ascertainable nor legally en-
forceable and hence was not a right in any normal sense of
that term."s
That is, O'Malley's control was derived directly from the trust in-
strument itself whereas Byrum's control resulted from the mere fact
that he was able to vote more than 50 percent of the outstanding
stock of the companies.'6 Although the distinction might be tenuous,
Justice White, for the dissent, merely expiessed a belief that the
cases were similar without any substantial justification for this be-
lief." In contrast, the majority opinion refused to equate the dis-
tinctly separate derivations of control. The Court has been consis-
tent with this view in other estate tax cases. For example, in United
States v. Estate of Grace'" where the doctrine of reciprocal trusts
was applied, the Court noted that the controlling factor was the
effect of such transfer. "The taxability of a trust corpus does not
hinge on a settlor's motives, but depends on the nature and opera-
tive effect of the trust transfer."' 9
Effects of Fiduciary Duty on 2036(a)(2)
The fundamental dilemma throughout both the majority and
dissenting opinions was that of defining the nature and extent of the
fiduciary duty of a majority stockholder. The Court's application of
a fiduciary duty, although not novel,'20 shed new light in the area of
estate planning. It is important to note that the majority assumed
a literal interpretation of "fiduciary duty,"' 2' in contrast to the dis-
senting opinion's subjective approach.2 2 The fiduciary duty of a ma-
jority stockholder, as well as the corporate directors, was not rede-
fined here. Rather, it was simply recognized. Numerous cases cited
by the majority proved the establishment of a duty of responsibility
15. 408 U.S. at 136-37.
16. Id. at 138,
17. Id. at 157.
18. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
19. Id. at 323.
20. The fiduciary duty concept has traditionally been applied in stockholder suits. See,
e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S.
282 (1929); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
21. 408 U.S. at 142.
22. Id. at 158.
1973]
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towards both the minority stockholders and the corporation itself.23
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself
first and his cestuis second. He cannot manipulate the af-
fairs of his corporation to [its] detriment and in disregard
of the standards of common decency and honesty. . . . He
cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the
detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how
absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how
meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements.24
It is submitted that Justice White, for the dissent, was remiss in
suggesting that this fiduciary duty had no truly "restraining effect."
White reached this conclusion by noting that few defendants have
been found guilty of breaching their fiduciary duty. But one need
only consult an executive who has been confronted with the de-
mands of the minority stockholders at corporate annual meetings to
discover management's total awareness of its responsibility.
No problems in establishing a fiduciary duty arose in Byrum
since he retained the right to vote more than 50 percent of the voting
stock in each of the three corporations. However, the majority was
aptly aware that the concepts of "control" and "controlling stock-
holder" were "too variable and imprecise to constitute the basis per
se for imposing tax liability under § 2036(a). 2 5 In those instances
where a stockholder owns less than 50 percent, the concept of "con-
trol" of the corporation is nebulous." For example, the voting con-
figuration of a block of stock is important to determine "control"
because of the many different types of voting rights. That is, one
vote may not, in fact, be equal to another. The concentration of
ownership, the size of the corporation and the number of stockhold-
ers also affect "control."2 Consequently, the majority took the more
practical approach by recognizing that "control" might in fact vary
from case to case.
Analysis
Although not detrimental to the fiduciary argument, the major-
23. See note 20 supra.
24. 308 U.S. at 311.
25. 408 U.S. 138 n.13.
26. Id.
27. Id. See, e.g., L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 770-83 (1961).
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ity opinion contains one flaw. Justice Powell suggested that the
dividends were truly "subject to business and economic variables,"2
notwithstanding Byrum's actual ability to declare a dividend
should earnings arise. This is true; but any reference to economic
variables is immaterial since the applicability of section 2036(a)(2)
depends not on whether income is received, but rather on the ability
to control such income should it arise.2 9
The dissent unsuccessfully attempted to discredit the major-
ity's least important argument, namely, the reliance argument. The
majority was hesitant to rule otherwise in Byrum because of the
possible invalidation of hundreds of similar inter vivos trusts which,
like Byrum, were prepared in reasonable reliance on Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co.30 There, the settlor had retained "broad powers
of management without adverse estate-tax consequences."'3 The
dissenting opinion in Byrum noted a distinction in the kinds of
control over income retained in Reinecke and those retained in
Byrum. According to the dissent, the Reinecke trust gave the settlor
direct control, whereas Byrum received only indirect control.
By according himself power of control the trust income by
an indirect means, [Byrum] kept himself quite free of a
fiduciary obligation measured by an ascertainable standard
in the trust agreement.32
This distinction is clearly without merit because for estate tax pur-
poses, the estate of a particular decedent is viewed fairly only by
considering the entire estate.3 3 So was the case in Byrum. Establish-
ing a fiduciary obligation in Byrum independent of the trust and by
way of corporate responsibility was sufficient.
SECTION 2036(a)(1)
Alternatively, the commissioner argued for inclusion under sec-
tion 2036(a)(1) because Byrum allegedly had retained the "enjoy-
ment" of the property.34 This "enjoyment" was based on Byrum's
alleged control over the corporation whereby he had supposedly
28. 408 U.S. at 140.
29. See note 3 supra.
30. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
31. 408 U.S. at 134.
32. Id. at 166.
33. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
34. See note 3 supra.
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"guaranteed himself continued employment and remunera-
tion .... ,5
Briefly, the majority argument was twofold. First, the Court
determined by prior case law that "enjoyment" or "substantial
present economic benefit" within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1)
was limited to
retention of an attribute of the property transferred-such
as a right to income, use of the property itself, or a power
of appointment with respect either to income or principal. 3
Thus, since section 2036(a)(1) had never been applied to Byrum-
type fact situations, the Court merely stated that the statute
did not apply. 37 The dissenting opinion suggested a flaw in this
reasoning by stating that the "plain language of the statute" was
ignored.38 Perhaps a more forceful counterargument to the major-
ity's position is that the meaning of a statute should not be limited
exclusively to prior application; otherwise statutes would never
cover changing circumstances.
The second argument, although summarily treated in the ma-
jority opinion, is fundamental to the Court's holding. A determina-
tion that Byrum had absolute discretion in setting the compensa-
tion that he himself would receive annually as chief operating officer
of the three corporations would have been necessary for the Court
to have found that he had retained enjoyment under section
2036(a)(1). However, directors owe a duty to the corporation and
shareholders to pay the officers and employees reasonable, and not
excessive, compensation.
It is clear that extraordinary, unusual and extravagant
amounts paid by a corporation to its officers in the guise
and form of compensation for their services, but having no
substantial relation to the measure of their services and
being utterly disproportioned to their value, are not in real-
ity payments for services, and cannot be regarded as 'ordi-
35. 408 U.S. at 145.
36. Id. at 149. See also United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969); Lober v.
United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949);
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir.
1971); McNichol v. Comm'r., 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
37. 408 U.S. at 150.
38. Id. at 154.
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nary and necessary expenses' within the meaning of the
section."
Therefore, the Court held that since Byrum was under a duty to pay
himself only a reasonable salary, he did not retain a "substantial
present economic benefit."40
The dissenting opinion further suggested that the benefits
which Byrum had retained, i.e., controlling shareholder status,
would have "fetched a substantial premium" in the marketplace.4
This analysis is only partially correct. First, Byrum was not legally
capable of selling his retained right to vote the shares held in trust.
Second, even if he could have sold them and received a premium,
the minority opinion failed to recognize that the value of the prem-
ium when sold would have been offset by the liability of the fidu-
ciary relationship while Byrum held the controlling interest.
CONCLUSION
The forerunner of section 2036 initiated the "postponed-
possession-or-enjoyment" test.2 With the passage of section 2036,
settlors were severely restricted as to the types of transfers that
would qualify for exclusion from the settlor's estate for estate tax
purposes. However, today's capital structure has required a slight
modification in applying section 2036 in order to tax equally estates
with different types of investments. To afford equal treatment, dif-
ferent arrangements of capital holdings require different types of
rules. Two trends are currently having an effect in this area of the
law.
First, many occasions arise when the sole shareholder of a fam-
ily corporation is unable to market his shares even though the book
value is substantial. On the other hand, a doctor or another profes-
sional who has invested his wealth in equally valuable listed securi-
ties probably is holding more marketable assets. In the family cor-
39. 278 U.S. at 292.
40. 408 U.S. at 150.
41. Id. at 155.
42. Historically, from 1916 to 1930, the "postponed-possession-or-enjoyment" test was
thought to encompass life estates. However, the test was severely restricted in May v. Heiner,
281 U.S. 238 (1930), where the decedent had retained a secondary life estate without having
the property included. The May holding was enlarged the following year to primary life
estates in Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931). The day after this decision was
handed down by the Supreme Court, Congress passed what is now section 2036. See B.
BrrrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 1158 (4th ed. 1972).
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poration situation, if the fiduciary duty concept is not accepted, any
type of transfer short of total transfer of all stock and powers to an
inter vivos trust would be included in the decedent's estate. How-
ever, the professional could create an irrevocable trust without the
necessity of retaining voting rights for either one of two reasons.
First, retention of the voting rights is usually not essential to his
particular type of investments. Second, he is seldom the controlling
stockholder.43 Consequently, to equate the two cases, the Court has
appropriately adopted the fiduciary duty concept to allow the fam-
ily corporate executive similar treatment concerning inter vivos
trusts.
Second, in some instances the opposite is true. That is, with the
advent of key-man life insurance, a share of stock of a closely held
corporation can be liquid.4 It is liquid because at the death of the
shareholder, his stock is redeemed or purchased with the insurance
proceeds.' 5 Accordingly, middle managers and senior executives of
small companies have demanded, and received, equity in these cor-
porations.4" Moreover, executives of small corporations are now con-
sidering the once forbidden minority share in lieu of total cash com-
pensation. As a result, competition has required many sole share-
holders to relinquish part ownership in their corporations. But, since
the viability of the small business enterprise is dependent upon the
ability of the owners to run the business, notice must be taken of
the importance of retaining the right to vote the stocks transferred.
The courts, as in the case at bar, have recognized this new trend and
are properly exercising their judicial power in protecting this ever-
increasing class of minority stockholders by imposing and enforcing
a fiduciary duty upon the majority shareholder. Consequently, the
Byrum holding will enable the estate planner to utilize the inter
vivos trust technique for the shareholder of a small company who
deems it necessary to retain the right to vote the shares transferred,
as well as for the doctor or professional with listed securities.
Because of the otherwise inequitable treatment, the Court rec-
ognized a certain flexibility in applying section 2036. Therefore,
Justice White, for the dissent, may not have been totally incorrect
43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036. Thus, without controlling interest, the stockholder
theoretically is incapable of determining dividend policy.
44. W. BOWE, ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION 368 (Chartered Life Underwriter ed.
1965).
45. Id. at 389.
46. Id. at 403.
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in suggesting that if past precedent had been followed, the Court
would have reached a different result. However, as in Darwin's
theory of the survival of the fittest, so must the courts of justice
adapt to changing circumstances in the modern economic context.
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